The gist of one of Strawson's-by now, familiar-objections [3] to Russell's theory of descriptions [2] is that a speaker may, quite naturally and correctly, utter a sentence of the form 'the F is G' to talk about, and be understood as talking about, a particular F even when it is commonly known that there is more than one F. Yet, the objection continues, by Russell's theory (RTD) such an utterance would strictly speaking be false.
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Modern Russellians-as is also well known-weather the attack by pointing out that the context in which an incomplete (definite) description is normally used will furnish either (a) an adequate 'completion' of the description or (b) an adequate delimitation of the domain of quantification. They come armed, moreover, with the Gricean distinction between expressed and intended propositions so that they can accommodate the intuition that utterances involving incomplete descriptions often convey object-dependent propositions. Since
Strawson himself takes contextual features to aid the singling-out of objects when descriptions are used (see e.g. [3] , pp. 21-22; [4] , pp. 186-87), it would appear that these Russellian moves lead more or less to a stand off (see Neale It would be a mistake to see this objection as merely a variation of
Strawson's point about the disparity between the verdict of ordinary language and RTD on a present-day utterance, k, of
The king of France is wise.
According to Strawson, we-that is, ordinary speakers-would be disinclined to proclaim the utterance either as true or as false, and, indeed, it does follow from what I say that we would be similarly disinclined in the case of t. But, there is a significant point of disanalogy: our discomfort with t stems from our inability to interpret it, i.e. to determine its truth-conditions, whereas we have no such difficulty in the case of k. In contrast to t, we do know (or think we know) what it would take for k to be true or false-France would have to have a (unique) king who was (or was not) wise. The newer objection therefore cuts deeper in my opinion.
Some readers may find the objection unconvincing precisely because the alleged counterexamples to RTD involve 'abnormal' uses of descriptions (and, consequently, 'abnormal' speakers of the language). The following thought does seem compelling: that if a theory of content is to be challenged by way of natural, examples; after all, the reasoning runs, no theory could be expected to account for abnormal uses-these simply resist any standard analysis. This response misses the point however, or, rather, 'mislocates' the clash. The utterer of t, for instance, is indeed an 'abnormal' speaker-in that she is using a description abnormally by our, that is ordinary speakers', lights. But, this is precisely what presents the problem for Russellians: as already noted, they owe an explanation of why it is that someone who uttered (1) in the envisaged circumstances would be regarded as 'abnormal', as having misused language, whereas someone who uttered (1a) would not be so regarded.
In any case, the objection can be made without recourse to deviant uses or speakers. Suppose that in the envisaged ('many-table') scenario we were asked to assess the correctness of certain sentences, among them (1) and (1a), which were generated by a computer and displayed on a screen (say). I venture that even in that situation we would be inclined to proclaim the token of (1a) as false but would experience as much difficulty in simply interpreting the token of (1), i.e. in determining its truth-conditions, as in the earlier example. So, we would have the same problem, but no actual deviant uses or users. 2 Another thought which might fuel reservations about the force of the objection is the thought that Russellians already have a perfectly adequate explanation of t's unintelligibility. Surely, it may be reasoned, the fact that it is manifestly false is quite sufficient to account for the difficulty we experience in interpreting t; it is only natural that we are highly reluctant to take the utterer as saying something which she clearly knows to be false. However, if this explanation were right, we would have no more difficulty in interpreting t than we would an utterance, in the same context, of the manifestly false (1a). But, intuitively, this just is not so.
2 I thank Peter Millican for suggesting something along these lines. 
